Victor Kraguer

Re 22d Party Congress, K Speech, Oct '61
after Khrushchev speech
also Malinovsky speech — re "aggressive" SU

2 passages about Cuba — examples of
attempts of US imperialists to provoke
the fire of a Third World War (provoking...)
(other examples: China, VN, ME.

on 3 main "flows of history"
1) attempts of US (imperialism) to provoke fires
(e.g. Laos, Cuba I, during Khrushchev)

2) growing power of SOC countries [Berlin?]

3) growing national liberation movements in TW

US as wanting world power — at risk of
provoking world war.

4) 7 flows: SU/SOC countries working to maintain
peace in the world

K suggested intention for future of Soviet policies

SU should create diplomatic forces (like creating a horse). (emphasized by special print, in Soviet publication).

— a form of regulating a force you can't destroy. (coercion without harming or destroying)

We wanted to show all the world that Soviet could do something "unacceptable" to the US, but US would have to accept it —

forces had changed, SU had to deal with on a new basis . .

a kind of parity [failed to define this in CIL]

This (lack of response by US) was more important than the actual change in the balance

Actual change may have been more important to Soviet; number of missiles (40) about same as number of US strategic

Keyed-for aggressive posture

bases in US? US thinks Soviet will soon probably very hotly & eager to get the missiles into Cuba. restitution, to

For Sov, it was a method for
Khrushchev speech — an effort to
balance US strategic forces

Not for K, who saw it as a symbolic act.

Evidence:

K was on shore of Black Sea with Malinovsky — saw the ships, thought about other shore, Turkey: asked, "Why can they have missiles this close, and we don't have any so close?"

Not an idea of strategic parity but of psych/moral parity.

K considered TW as a kind of response, a supplement of low foreign policy — show TW that SU would do anything possible

VS thinks there was NO real relation to Berlin

Europe was considered too dangerous to press in. [But after minds could be reworked, at UN — a new balance, in which all world issues could be negotiated]

Gromyko, in April of 1989, article in Izvestia: connection with K — "What will reaction of US to deployment..."

Gromyko gave strong answer (report): "There will be a lot of noise* in US..." (not said, in USG; implicitly, in US public!)

VS: This is not a strong warning; "noise" in her politics doesn't support fear, crisis

*Yakovlev: "a political explosion"

Immediately after K read the cable, he decided to send a new Cable — Alexeev

like Mikoyan, Alexeev did not understand his ground for predicting to K that Castro would refuse missiles.

Alexeev's small meeting in Moscow with K, Gromyko, Malinovsky, Biryuzov (Chief of Strat Forces) Kozlov, Mikoyan

on: How to convince Castro?

(Alexeev presented arguments against K position: (different atmosphere from Stalin Castro wouldn't accept.

Formed a delegation

Alexeev, Rashidov, Biryuzov

dep. Politburo members,

First Sec. of Uzbekistan

R never before involved in foreign policy; but he was considered as someone who understands TW problems.

R, was the part of [illegible] not as Cubans to TW countries.

Soviet delegation proposed to Castro that this deployment was for the defense of Cuba.

Castro said he didn't consider a defense of Cuba at all, but he would do this for SU, for socialist solidarity.

(from Alexeev at Moscow meeting and " Popov)

Castro welcomed the (psych, TW) motives of K move.

For defense of Cuba, it would have been sufficient to put 20,000 Soviet troops

[why not, both — as he did?

"But troops alone would imply Cuba had become — not a TW country — but a Soviet ally; this would have

had a negative impact – TW.

But missiles right how obligations to work; to defend Cuba; not just to have a low boat

Marginally, to defend Cuba, enough to make open contract and how troops

At most, Castro wanted open commitment / treaty with Sovs before deployment

(But to Sovs, very hard to deploy after that – might be blockade.

Also, it would look like a bilateral decision, raising Castro's prestige – "doing it for our world."

K wanted a unilateral gesture, for K to announce at UN;

We liked the kind of symbol; our low space program; all focused – drop missiles – after, big headlines

States could have done it differently;
Create many many mines; the
Soviet sub. fleet gets an new
balance

Some organized aid to Khr is just
starting — was announced till recently.

"Strictly speaking, there was no direct
legal in the statutes in Sept.

Formula was suggested by JFK — he
said in Sept, "if offensive weapons

[

[Why did K send missiles?
"Because he wanted to announce
at UN in November — couldn't wait a year."

What of risk that US would invade Cuba before K announcement in Nov. UN?

(without knowing

VS: "If think K was convinced US would not invade before the election."

(Possible results...

"This is only possible explanation for K's KKKKK under-estimation of risk ...

But why would K think this?

Long term

VS: Blockade measures were not enough to support vital interests of US

— SEK would need the good will and coop. of K

VS thinks JFK thought blockade alone would, with help of SU/K, lead to K removing the missiles.

"+ Thinks missiles — trade a dead horse (created the

Wf would K accept a private trade?

The risk of the blockade

Fall 85, no mention of missile deployment to Cuba — only "defensive weapons."

K position was very difficult; if he didn't win. Very expensive; big mil. involvement; Cuba...

— Thought discussed poss. of

K said: In any case, we do not want a war.

We must have made a finding decision to remove the missiles if necessary.

Maybe secret removal (!)

If US discovers, it may not through dip. channels

Bundy: "All was calculated." But he couldn't give an example; "it's absolutely obvious there was no calculation."

Bergeen seminar 10 May 90

Counterfactual analysis – opportunities that were not pursued.

Diffnt types of political cultures can have diffnt types of rationality;
certain situation/clashes/crises can have this

Political rationality: diffnces in social and political ontology
– diffnt knowledge of what the political world is; how to classify, conceptualize

a) Managerial rat. (procedural) (each step is organized toward goal)

b) Process: one affects flow of process
(Stalin, Mao, Lenin K...)(old Chinese; Taoist?]

Process/flow is independent of one's political will; one can help or hinder the development.

[ORGANIC? vs., Rivers]

Intermediate

18th-19th British style

History as a set of forces processes of rise and fall of polit. forces: one tries to arrange alliances, balances

a bit marginal
not a game: but an attempt to balance

low approach determined of "flow of history" rationality

[But is that not because K effected a successful fait accompli, permitting no effective counter-move by JFK

(secrecy until operational;

or, secrecy-maintained-with-help-of-friends till after election/operational:

"Nothing JFK can or will do (before election (he "can't" attack operational missiles)

[But he

Desire to sanctify intolerable to US —
that would be
yet which US would have to tolerate

[i.e. this demonstration would change the world perception of the pre-existing balance, to recognize it as parity;

based on what?

VS suggests: (a) the size of her warheads (58 MT — "which was really larger than expected, ~78 MT"

(b) (?) the SU ICBMs which were clearly coming soon (K tends to claim — acted to counts-to-come as "now") counts?—

[but — a crisis, "soon" is not "now"! Offer to rig out surface-ship + fast to forestall — if FA fails!

Hyp: FA for with "process thinking" because it evades need for "must — "move-countermove" thinking

Cuban: This should be done to show all the world that there is a new situation in the world, a new willingness and esp. to protect TW news [not, "to change the balance"]

VS: just to protect Cuba, how troops were enough.

[Hyp: how will may have wanted to change the strat balance (to parity) but K may have believed (like DFR and McN! + McG!) that parity already existed [40 ICBMs (?) existing (operational? No) and bigger warheads]

and what was needed was a dramatic event that would lead world to recognize and acknowledge this

VS thinks K thought of deployment as reversible (? or irreversible?

"can be taken back"

[or is he saying that US saw it this way?]

ExCom did not see K move as (successful) FA;

but that was after JFK took the position. Nitze + Rusk first did see it as an FA! Thus, K could have succeeded!

and see McN/JFK feeling about stock!

From point of view of JFK/McN, K move did succeed, as FA; forced them to contemplate trade.

But they didn't admit that to public, or to ExCom;

and the cover, the pretense, the bluff, to the public succeeded in undoing FA, defeating it.

, a [illegible] treaty

Open deployment was rejected if K knew of blockade likelihood

(despite illegality; like exporting

TRO efforts of USG vs. PP

and prosecution of me!

[which I/we would have exported even if we knew the real laws (e.g. the prior + current legal ones

see attitude of Acheson re 'law';

like that of Nixon's WH, portion Dept.

US:

* "If JFK had understood K/Sov form of rationality, he could/would have solved situation & prevent disaster [what threats?] ... K would have removed the security."

[if K had understood that symbolic action had failed, nibbling, his effort at FA — "he would have removed the missiles, security.

[but the assumes, understands K's Cuban, his/military

George Bresslauer:

— sees K as in a crisis in 1962 in his relations with China (and at home)

— Ann Arbor speech

if he [illegible] is: he would defend [illegible] criticism from China...

In a year (62) he was doing quick fixes, in domestic affairs — splitting Party, Soviet (in foreign?)... he was looking for a formula...

China was criticizing SU for abandoning process was of flow of history — gone conservative

Other years saw showed caution in crisis — this [reckless?] behavior needs more circumstantial exploration

VS: In Moscow conf, nobody (SU) agreed with pressures of SU domestic politics

What pressures there were put to premier on this type of symbolic action.

[By "rationality" one can mean, What are the criteria of blame or credit, accountability (relating to process of deciding, and to character, values, feelings, as well as results or even belief results — actions/decisions, restraint...

This can be (is) externally determined!

Gromyko: said "Noise", not "political explosion" ("storm")

vs. Goldzeier

McG, speaking of "leaders" — meaning
UFR, LBJ, and K (& the Brits) — as differs from analysts:
— as having a secret from public:

Soviet did resist between US and SU from
1950/54 on

no willingness to launch a nuclear
attack on a nuclear power!

(not just "caution, reluctance...

[but: a) vs. non-nuc power? (recall Khrushchev vs. McG/Kennan
b) COW, presumption
c) if SU offensive plan were triggered,

i.e. did they risk nuc exchange (on EU)
was it greater than they thought?

Does VS think that K's willingness to leave/ risk a war means that action was effective only if US failed to react at all? What if US responded and had to back down: Trouble? Trust?

Soviet style of diplomacy is based on total rejection of ~~case~~ responsibility

Wouldn't that be a success?

[But — a battleship of Cuba, just as, a battleship of Turkey?

No-invasion pledge: sufficient?

(Compared to recent US planning i '62 — yes!)

I ask VS: What if there went to Cuba had reported, "There is a signif. poss. of detection?" Wouldn't K then have to face: What would US do? and what should I do?

VS: K wouldn't have addressed this (?!)

VS

"We could have you dead — a [illegible] (?
risk-taker — on of 10% chance of success.
Because he could have him sure he
could withdraw missiles, secretly."

me: 2) But what if US had attacked, instead of
negotiating?

"We couldn't conceive that." (?)

(3) [illegible] How could he count on Castro to
keep his mouth shut, not complain, denounce
him to TV, if he withdrew.

"We couldn't imagine Castro would do that."

[K learned, in crisis?!]

---

me: are you almost certain that K would
have withdrawn secretly if JFK had
challenged him secretly?

"Yes"

[How could JFK be any sure of that?

Maybe it would be time if missiles/more were discovered well before the new operational (or even, then).

But wasn't Oct 16 too late?

Wouldn't K, if th, have counted

Even if he didn't want to talk any risk, initially: once he is told exactly he is facing a risk: (s) must be behind that?

Always, stay determined.

Why not, again, refuse to see strong risk? (with some basis!)

B) Does he not, if th, having counted himself, exposed himself, have intention to take some risk?

China, Cuba, TW, military...

Can he count on VFK, before election, having solved abt successful thrust?

Did he think VFK would keep this secret long?! (+ Control!)

If, as VS says, K didn't ask risks,
couldn't see risks, discriminate, calculate...

This would make him very dangerous!
Provocative, reckless, a loose cannon:
unpredictable, uncontrollable, indeterminate...!

(WJ did see risks, tho, on Oct 27—
enough to act unilaterally on Oct 28
(having consulted narrowly on Oct 26-27
proposals) — which helped bring down
down in '64!

Nicaragua:

Contrast impression given by
JFK "pursuit" as focus of
- SU buildup
- Cuba I, aftermath
- Rapid changes
- input on election
- JFK devoid of intent to invade,
at the time (?)
and by McN, McG - 1987!

with reality of 1961-62! (Cuba + Brazil)
and of Oct '62!
Kennedy "obsession"
(and Nixon!)

THUS, IMAGINE HOW MISSILES "HIT" HIM! (Not, "Here we go!")

Crowd Profiles - Camp
+ WJ England Host

like VCS!

SPLIT FROM
VCS!

Knock
Sorensen as script-
writer

cf. CARTER ON HOSTAGE RESCUE?!

(for JFK — see likelihood that Mongoose and Cat plans would come out — from JCS — if he didn't indicate willingness to attack — up to the limit!

(no one has recorded JCS altitude after CII!)

"We had him" (Castro and K)

JFK's Fait Accompli averted a K thrust to Berlin!

(a riot of "secret diplomacy")

But if K had succeeded — without any US blockade of Cuba — it would have cut strategic for him then to initiate a blockade of Berlin!

"Owl" — to cover blockade, cult,
public confrontation! (see Hamilton)
to protect JFK from +H&N charge he
was a "hawk"
(he acted like one)
or a dove
(he was, really!)

What would JFK have done if missiles
had been detected in Sept 15 — like Cuirapos
— before any Pres warning
(JFK pressed by Reps,
+ Brian Lindsey)
— well before election
(time...)
secret diplomacy?

Hyp: K did not anticipate public warning
(or modify its effort?)
— time of Pres response not of JFK warning

VS

(What if JFK had said, "NO SS missiles"?
(Didn't he?)

instead of "offensive weapons"

What would Soviets have said? privately?
" " " done? publicly?

Would they have lied?

(Did

US ignores Pres' & private warnings!
(Answers national SSMs, didn't they?)

Appearance of - lying (insult)
- insult - ignoring warning
(Warning had not aroused
rebuke from anyone - in US, NATO, CA
or SU! which explained
lack of intent/need to defy
warning, thus lightening
the US threat!)

Crisis problem: the failed Pres threat,
commitment!

(see this section to have been
tied to by Allies
just before election!

[Go back to Suez
+ U-2
Skybolt

By crisis study!

VN 1965 + TG: also after (silent)
warnings to NO
failed!
Likewise, troops after fanfare of RT
which was designed as a
THREAT!
Likewise, RMN / Quat Noof!
→ Cambodia
etc....

NEED TO VINDICATE FAILED THREATS (last, "Domino")

N dial is VN want be critical
CBV for: Gradual Escalation!
thanks to Momentum!

(our bis self-criticism, Lima 1990!)

Aug 4

Nikitin
Sergeev May 14 1990

Baltiskoe (Mikoyan quote: in B+W?
But only in US sources?
Not: New Times
Moscow Conf.

VS: If JFK had said, "No SSMs"
it would have made a

Kondrashov, in 1989, in Moscow News Mirror
tells story of CTB #8
Up negative assessment of
deployment — first criterion in
Russia...

"Brought both countries to brink of
nuclear war."

Criticized secrecy...
and attempts of hers to cover it afterwards
— example of recent policy made
entirely civic secrecy, by KGB: but
whole country in danger, without knowing or
participation...

VS

Wf is urgent diplomacy not discussed in ExCom? after motion by Rusk.

Wf hyp: US thought: R wouldn't have done this unless he was willing to take a big risk — to get us to back down — we must convince R risk is even bigger; we can't do that by starting with (silent) words: "he's got to see your moves."

VS

Wf not discuss: 1) doing nothing (Wf is that "impossible?")

2) Diplomacy: a) direct — Dobrynin

b) intermediaries: de Gaulle UK

c) U Thant

US didn't consider (VS hyp): it wouldn't willy

to

Monroe Doctrine: "legal basis" for US
any aggressive action [No – see JFK comment]

Blockade: Berlin case in '48: expression of
US policy, very vital area;
when US was in Soviet's position, with
crude military position

[Did US think it was reproducing
Soviet strategy — "perhaps unconsciously."
Yes

VS: Do I know recent op-ed case
(he thinks NO chapter).

Korea:

VS: "I can't talk seriously the threat to K's sign a treaty with GDR; it was K's style to

"If he had been serious, he would have signed treaty recently, as F.A.! as in CII"

VS on Goldgeier:

K used a very coercive style in domestic policy — "but not F.A." [vs. Goldgeier]

VS does not agree with Goldgeier that K used some approach in external policy as in domestic.

K never discussed any sophisticated policy issues in Politburo (or with Bergei): his statement style.

In a smaller group, he discussed — but didn't like to reveal.

"this, not a F.A."

VS: JFK's understanding of US role

US had possibility to manage all crises in the world: US superiority

Only 2 threats to US security:

1) SU missiles

2) instability = TW

[Why a threat?

In CII, he saw these two dangers in the same place.

VS thinks JFK feared that Castro, not K, controlled the missiles.

[NO]

VS thinks: JFK saw a serious instability in Cuba — civil war (?) — guerillas

Husak ?! Dubcek

Czech forces were not so
unequal to WTO forces

"If Dubcek had not signed
or had repudiated it"
the public does agree...

D.

CII

15 May

VS: Fomin in Moscow Conf explained that he had invented his proposal

"but I suspect it's not true; I suspect he had discussed it with Zorin at least — he had seen Z. just before Scali.

But not with Dobrynin. D. said he sent a telegram to Moscow immediately; he expected K's second letter (Friday night) as an answer to this telegram. [Date time of RFK proposal on Sunday → Sat morning SU proposal, drafted earlier (Mikoyan) than Fri. night

VS thinks K was ready to settle on final terms from .22 Oct on (or 24th?)

(Fomin proposal irrelevant this — though K's letter is consistent with either approach: Fomin or Turkey trade!) [VS thinks military were objecting to Fomin/K approach, on Friday & Saturday —]

[Still — why not stay with "his own" proposal a few hours longer? Hyp: it's won't his proposal, it was RFK's/JFK's! Which JFK/RFK were now "rejecting" (Sat. night); so, go to fallback immediately [GIVEN RISKS!]

VS on Perestroika

"From scientific point of view, he can't succeed. Yet, every time he confronts challenges that are thought to assure failure, he doesn't fail. Very strange: (His political skill?)

He lacks serious mass support for his policy changes — How can you implement "new" & democratic moves, without support?

Last year, only 30% of pop supported market economy (3 years ago, 10-15%

How can you implement political pluralism, & democratic moves, when only 30-40% supported it?

It seems impossible — but we see how it is going. A kind of political enigma.

"I believe in a kind of hatred and — despite appearances

Hyp on revolutionary processes:.

— Present sit. *is* a rev situation;
"It's a rev."

Rev: serious changes in social structures. But in any soc, there are "legal" structures and others: e.g. in '70's, huge black economy — affected politics (?) esp. in Middle Asian Repubs.

"contingent" or "illegal"/hidden structures.

One way to rev. is to legalize the hidden structures.

Peter the Great — White Rev — change by elite, to bring virtual structures up to support a international role.

— ~~Mass~~ Mass rev — Black Rev — Khomeini —
restores old, traditional popular rev.

Slogans: c.f. French Rev: first Red, then
under Robespierre, White Rev; then under
Napoleon, Black (monarchist. [Just, mass?]
[War]
Civil War — enforcing a new order by
force (not just vs. Whites), by militant
mob., not mass support.

NEP did have mass support,
consensus about future; conservative structures
(with new slogans).

~1900, only 4 million workers in industry,
3M educated, in govt, civil service...

Now, close to West; in 60's & 70's new
type of social dev — existing pol. structures now
in contradiction to new social relations — but pol.
consciousness in "conservative" till recently — a
gap.

?

G proposes a "permanent Red Rev"

- to change mass consciousness
- to change structure step by step; to
might of modern state; without violating
mass consciousness.

It's not a "white rev" — not a plan,
trying to introduce market economy in 3 months.

Dems blame G for being so conservative,
moving so slowly...

G is creating a new moment of his action;
he is creating new circumstances for emergence of new
forces — then he tries to balance them with
old forces (why?)

"Nobody knows what causes riots in Central
Asian Republics — what forces are at work,
in Dushanbe..."

Thus, Can't propose 5-year policy; only one
step at a time.

15 mg

CII

VS a Pluralist:

I am afraid of fascist development in country — main danger — another Black Reign — another Khomeini .... a horrible prospect.

I think G's step-by-step policy may prevent this ... echoes Washington

Bruckner: (so you say ...) G keeps raising the costs to a backlash

VS: in '70's, system of monopolies — 100 ministries with great pol. power — can't be destroyed by one law ...

("ending 10,000 units — world coord., "plan"; now millions of units, powerful planners ...]

Rochlin: Shatalin is soc. scientists supports fundamental democracy

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In China, the bureaucracy was destroyed in '60's by Cultural Rev — a happy result — bus. can't exist outside "free econ zones," as Ministries did in SU.

Russian nationalists:

a) Monarchist; favorable to Cap.; wants reorg, even <u>const.</u> order

(In 3 days, May 19, is birthday of last Tsar — may be birth of Monarchist Constitutional Party .... pos. to "call" a new monarch from Romanov family.

(b) extreme populist, neo-fascist: support "socialist" idea in populist form; Russian isolation; Church, old Russian culture, + <u>soc</u> ideas (?) (communitarian tradition + countryside).

Red Rev type:

Changes in cultural/hidden structures are hyperbolic — English Rev, around 1848 ... Cap + French ("Cap. rev") (<u>not</u> Russian Rev!) Kerensky! not Lenin! (White?

why not?
("Red is ~~black~~ life, white is mind, black is death.")

[G is manqué a type of Red Rev:
where pop. consciousness & new
structures are encouraged to grow, emerge
— not pre-existing mass consciousness...

VS

When G came to power, he had an image of
the end, but not an image of the way.
(modern Western state: [not, "econ"?]
VS: not clear on

Started with econ; but in 1½ years, clear
that this was disaster, because of monopolies: ministries
He wanted to release new forces to criticize Ministries: glasnost.
VS notions of pol. learning: reflects Rumelhart
(Stanford?): learning of neural networks, distributed
learning: local optimization, feedback, connection,
eventually emergent

CR

Symmetry : JFK/K "problems" and strategy

/ (F.A.!

Symbolic conflict bluff!

gaps with Soviets

unwilling to go to war

or take (determined)

high or moderate risk

— unrecognized by JFK + K!

e.g.: why didn't K tell JFK about UA SAM firing?

Well, why didn't JFK tell K about SAC U-2?!

(same morning!)

VS read Forrestal at Hoover, Int. 1 Jan and June '62. Expected growing concern about invasion after April '62. Instead

Jan 10 – "US is preparing invasion."
Jan 19 – by article: "Impossible to destroy freedom of Cuba.
Jan 23 – correspondence on article by Joe Dawson, World
"Castro will be dismissed."

(Punto del Este Jan 24-31: 14 nations (2/3 Hemisph) expelled Castro Cuba – though this conflicted with Charter of OAS.

Jan 22

Rosvelt Gilpatric: Cuba is a threat to the US – We will determine our attitude toward Cuba in definite time. (?)

Every day something on Cuba.

till Feb 20: SU Gov statement, very large

"I have serious reason to conclude the deployment of missiles was discovered in Feb, not April.

"Cuban Gov continued to produce statements that they had no intention to give the territory for the military bases of any states.

(

but the US told: In what part of Cuba is there a Soviet base, not of what kind? An air base, a missile base, or a fleet base? Let the show a request of SU to create a military base on Cuba!

Nobody can do this. Because a Cuban there was no, and there is no, Soviet military base. ["Not denied – There will be no base."]

If the US does threaten Cuba, let the Soviets infer
about states where US bases are situated."

[If ... then [Sunday:] may be threatened also.]

Somebody in the US states policy on the principle of
"position of strength" (power): but this is a button with
two ends. [:)] And if the US could take one end,
other states must take the other end of the button and
begin to act against forces in the US which want to
use this button for the threat against the SU and
other peace-loving countries.

[VS: I wonder how this was analyzed in US.

What is this button?

— Aggression vs. Cuba.

or — Deployment of missiles near the SU (Sunday).

Many points have pre-disposed the deployment.
~~Expl~~ Uncertainty about the future: options on
no SU bases at present, but no notion of future.
(First?) notion of possible missile base on Cuba;
there must have been a discussion beforehand about
possibility of a missile base. Why did they mention it —
not just "military base"?

[VS: don't know; but there
there must have been discussion
about possible US mil. threat to
Cuba, [illegible] and how to respond.]

Then, after Feb 20, almost no mention of Cuba!
for 3 months. (US effected by discussion in March
+ April, then not after April! Once Politburo decides,
if Sergo Mikoyan was right, board on what to further told us.

not to attract attention to problem.

But this dropped in February, not April.

15 April 1989

Gromyko said in Yugoslavia that he had impression that problem had been discussed much earlier with the military.

(May 20, 1962)

When Gro. & K returned from Bulgaria in plane, when no one was near, K wanted to talk with Gromyko. K had a new thought, and he wanted to share this thought with a man who is expert in foreign policy.

"K thought, situation around Cuba was very dangerous. To rescue Cuba as an independent state, it was necessary to deploy a Cuba a number of missiles. One million Only that can rescue the country. Washington wouldn't stop with the failure at Playa Giron. What do you think about all this?

K waited for an answer. The question was interpreted very difficult. I thought, for a few minutes and answered. "The operation in the Bay of Pigs was an organized, aggressive action of the US on Cuba. I know the situation in US, where I was for 8 years. I was an Ambassador. I should honestly tell you that the deployment of our missiles on Cuba will produce a political explosion in the US. I'm sure of this, and this should be taken into account."

I couldn't tell that my opinion was pleasant for K. [i.e. it was not] I interpreted that having such words he might be angry. Nevertheless, this was not the case. But I had a definite feeling that he didn't want to change his position. We were silent,

and suddenly he said: "We need not (have) a nuclear war, and we have no intention to fight."

He said this very in a very hard (tough) voice, and I had a feeling that the formula, as the first [we should deploy missiles] was well-thought. well-considered

I paid attention to the fact that he didn't say this immediately after the first. And when I had heard this, I had a better feeling. Even the voice of K, it seemed to me, became softer. I was silent. I didn't want to add something to what I had said. anything

(Bron. was not the author of Politburo's Central Committee? For. Min.)

K said, "I will discuss this question very soon in the meeting of the Presidium of the CC."

What is important is that K expressed his opinion, to us and the in Presidium, without any doubts. I had the impression that with the initial this question was arranged earlier.

I had a feeling that Malinovsky had supported K's suggestion without any objection.

[VS: Why no discussion about possible reaction by US Government? VS thinks: Soviet officials didn't consider the US reaction, none of them. K's knowledge of US was very restricted; thinks K accepted picture of US in SU press: USG was helpless in hands of MIC + RC.

He didn't understand or consider role of Congress and public opinion. "He just thought (metaphor) it's like

Europe; and when we first heard (missiles) in Cuba, we won't be able to do anything.

[Why they went?]

VS: general style of how diplomacy, to produce a surprise: Khrushchev, Gagarin ...

for dramatic effect, to organize a show

VS: does not think K worried about a blockade: they're military right down worried.

VS: I think K had thought about the possibility that he might remove the missiles.

(common to Dobrynin)

VS: don't think K worked consciously of JFK reaction except first by secret diplomacy.

Alexeev in Argentina: Fact (

When the idea to deploy missiles emerged?

(Feb?)

To the beginning of the spring, the Cuban + how you came to the conclusion to take some measures to prevent an American invasion.

... In the beginning of May I was asked to go to Moscow as Ambassador [bet. 5-8 May]

In our conversation (Kozlov, ... Mikoyan, Rashidov (2 members of Polit. 1, others), Malinovsky, Biryuzov

I heard for first time about intention to deploy missiles. K asked me about Cuban attitude to this decision, I may tell you that after this question I became as a stone. [without movement ...] I answered that it's difficult to imagine that

Fidel would agree; would be built all his strategy on the defense of the revolution on strengthening the solidarity with world public opinion vd US public opinion on Cuba; vd a low minded delegation will definitely destroy this support.

[no longer pursues as independent TW country.

K thought, to prevent an American invasion of Cuba, a sense of determination is needed... something that would restrict US plans and would bring Cuba into the center of world politics.

[VBS: support to US point of view; world opinion, not any strat. value of determination]

[Would Soviet troops alone have stopped JFK? MCN?

(JCS: no).

"US should be convinced that in the case of attack by

Each side considered that its violence would cause/compel a violent response, no matter how dangerous, "irrational" it might seem, no matter how hard to control.

But with convinced that an action short of violence, a NV action, might still evoke a violent response, and/or a dangerous, aggressive, threatening, provocative violent response.

(for JFK: threats to Cuba; esp, attack on Cuba (not bases in Turkey

VS " how leaders didn't consider that US leaders didn't consider Cuba as a sovereign state

VS: like SU and Czech – 1968!

SU would have accepted US invasion of Cuba – 1961

Sovs saw a different situation in 1962, when Cuba was "a socialist country"

Suppose there had been multi-party election – 1968 in Czech, in which Cons lost.

1969

Would Brezhnev have accepted that this changed the situation?

US would not